Catholic University Law Review
Volume 68
Issue 4 Fall 2019

Article 13

2019

Alternative Remedies for Undocumented Workers Left Behind in a
Post-Hoffman Plastic Era
Rachel S. Steber

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Immigration Law Commons, and the Labor and
Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Rachel S. Steber, Alternative Remedies for Undocumented Workers Left Behind in a Post-Hoffman Plastic
Era, 68 Cath. U. L. Rev. 757 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol68/iss4/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

Alternative Remedies for Undocumented Workers Left Behind in a Post-Hoffman
Plastic Era
Cover Page Footnote
J.D. The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2019; B.A. The University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2010. The author would like to thank her family and friends for their support, Matt
Ginsburg for his expert guidance and feedback, and The Catholic University Law Review staff and editors
for helping edit this Comment.

This article is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol68/iss4/13

ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES FOR UNDOCUMENTED
WORKERS LEFT BEHIND IN A POST-HOFFMAN
PLASTIC ERA
Rachel S. Steber+
In 2002, when the Supreme Court ruled that undocumented immigrant
workers were not entitled to back pay or reinstatement under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)1in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,2
employers were essentially emboldened to violate workers’ rights with minimal
consequences.3 The Court found that extending back pay and reinstatement to
undocumented workers when employers violated the NLRA completely
bypassed the goals of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA),4
exceeding the authority delegated to the National Labor Relations Board
(Board).5 It stated, the Court has “never deferred to the Board’s remedial
preferences where such preferences potentially trench upon federal statutes and
policies unrelated to the NLRA.”6
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1. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
2. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137 (2002). The majority
opinion was authored by Justice Rehnquist, and was narrowly decided in a 5–4 decision. Id. at
151–52.
3. See id. at 155–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer acknowledges the possibility
that immigration enforcement might instead be weakened by preventing the Board from awarding
backpay. Id. He states “[t]o deny the Board the power to award backpay, however, might very
well increase the strength of th[e] magnetic force [of immigrant labor].” Id. at 155. See also
Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 376, 380 (2011), supp. by Mezonos Maven Bakery,
Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (2015). Former Chairwoman Liebman and then-Member Pearce state in
their concurring opinion that Hoffman Plastic’s holding undermines the NLRA’s enforcement and
“employees are chilled in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, the work force is fragmented, and
a vital check on workplace abuses is removed. Id. at 380. Further, they state “the backpay remedy
also serves a deterrent function by discouraging employers from violating the [NLRA] . . . [t]he
foreseeable result will be widespread retaliation against undocumented workers brave . . . enough
to assert their rights under the [NLRA].” Id.
4. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012).
5. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 144; see also Southern S.S. Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942) (holding that while the Board possesses broad discretion to effectuate the
policies of the Act, its authority is not unlimited and the Board may not “wholly ignore other and
equally important Congressional objectives”).
6. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 144.
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Hoffman Plastic arose out of a challenge to the administrative authority of the
Board in its application of NLRA remedies to undocumented workers.7 Section
160(c) of the NLRA allows the Board to direct offending employers to remedy
their unfair labor practices in any manner necessary to advance the goals of the
NLRA.8 On this authority, prior to Hoffman Plastic, the Board routinely
awarded back pay to workers aggrieved by an employer’s unfair labor practices,
regardless of the worker’s immigration status.9 In its decision in A.P.R.A. Fuel
Oil Buyers Group, Inc., on which the Board rested one of its primary arguments
in Hoffman Plastic, “the Board determined that ‘the most effective way to
accommodate and further the immigration policies embodied in [IRCA] is to
provide the protections and remedies of the [NLRA] to undocumented workers
in the same manner as to other employees.’”10 Hoffman Plastic, however,
nullified this practice and prevented the Board from effectuating the NLRA in
ways that facially clash with the IRCA.11
7. See Katherine Seitz, Enter at Your Own Risk: The Impact of Hoffman Plastic Compounds
v. National Labor Relations Board on the Undocumented Worker, 82 N.C. L. REV. 366, 387 (2003).
Seitz summarizes the procedural history leading to the Supreme Court’s consideration of Hoffman
Plastic, stating that after the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected petitions for the case based on
clear compliance with Supreme Court precedent, “[t]he Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
the NLRB’s grant of the limited back pay remedy” and “[i]n a split-decision, the [] Court concluded
that the NLRB had no authority to order a backpay award.” Id.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a), (c) (2012); Southern S.S. Co., 316 U.S. at 46. The Supreme Court
also likely granted certiorari in Hoffman Plastic to resolve the growing tension between circuits on
undocumented workers’ eligibility to backpay awards. See Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,
976 F.2d 1115, 1122 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that “Section 274A of IRCA, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a),
makes it unlawful for an employer to hire an undocumented alien; and thus, clearly bars the Board
from awarding backpay to undocumented aliens wrongfully discharged after IRCA’s enactment.”);
Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers’ Union v. N.L.R.B., 795 F.2d 705, 717–18 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that the Supreme Court previously “gave no indication that it was overruling a significant
line of precedent . . . in determining . . . eligibility for backpay” and therefore declines to consider
an employee’s immigration status as relevant in determining the availability of remedies).
9. See A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408 (1995). In this guiding
decision, the Board stated:
Congress has enacted both the NLRA and the statutes regarding immigration, specifically
IRCA, to further virtually identical policy objectives with respect to the American
workplace . . . [t]hus . . . we believe that we can best achieve this mutuality of purpose
and effect by vigorously enforcing the NLRA, including providing traditional Board
remedies, [for] all employees.
Id. at 411; Regal Recycling, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 355, 357 (1999) (ordering the employer “to offer
the seven discriminatees immediate reinstatement with backpay” provided that they are able to
produce relevant documentation of their employment eligibility); Cty. Window Cleaning Co., 328
N.L.R.B. 190, 199–200 (1999) (finding that, based on the Board’s careful consideration of
balancing the interests of both the NLRA and IRCA in A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., the order of
reinstatement and backpay to the undocumented workers unlawfully coerced out of supporting the
union campaign was warranted).
10. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 141 (citing A.P.R.A Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., 320
N.L.R.B. at 1060).
11. See James Meehan, Undocumented Workers, the National Labor Relations Act, and the
Immigration Reform and Control Act: Irreconcilable Differences or a Match Made in Legal
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Since Hoffman Plastic, the Board’s ability to effectively carry out the purpose
of the NLRA has been curtailed. Without the ability to award back pay and
reinstatement to undocumented workers, the bargaining power between
employers and both documented and undocumented workers is tipped in favor
of employers. Although the NLRA is remedial, rather than punitive,12 the
holding in Hoffman Plastic erases the most effective means of remedying the
wrongs of noncomplying employers and instead signals that violating the NLRA
comes with little to no consequences.13 Further, by dividing the workforce
between those workers worthy of remedies and those not, Hoffman Plastic
condones a sub-class of workers in high demand and with little to no rights.14
As the undocumented workforce has grown dramatically in the past 20 years,
this not only devalues the NLRA, but also disadvantages authorized American
workers, essentially eroding the goals of IRCA that the Court originally sought
to uphold.15
Nine years after the Court decided Hoffman Plastic, former Board Chair
Wilma Leibman and then-Member Mark Pearce authored a concurring opinion
after the Board held that, based on the Hoffman, it was unauthorized to award
back pay and reinstatement to an employee fired for union activity, even if the
employer had knowingly hired an undocumented worker.16 Liebman and Pearce
believe “the Act’s enforcement is undermined, employees are chilled in the
exercise of their Section 7 rights, the work force is fragmented, and a vital check
on workplace abuses is removed.”17 In response, they leave the door open to
Heaven?, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 601, 615–16 (2014). It could be argued, too, that future potential
immigration reform might be an effective means to remedy the employers’ incentive to hire
undocumented workers and prolong the clash with labor law, however such an argument is outside
the scope of this Comment.
12. See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012).
13. See Peter F. Shapiro, Union Shops, not Border Stops: Updating NLRB Sanctions to Help
Organize Immigrant Workers After Hoffman, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1069, 1074 (2010).
14. Seitz, supra note 7, at 387–88.
15. See Shapiro supra note 13, at 1074.
16. Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 376, 380 (2011). Former Chairperson
Liebman and then-Member Pearce, agreeing with dissenting Justice Breyer, believe that the Court’s
holding achieves the opposite of the intended purpose of curtailing the illegal employment of
undocumented workers, and rather, that “imposing backpay liability on the Respondent is necessary
. . . to ‘make[] clear that violating the labor laws will not pay.’” Id. (quoting Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 154 (2002)). In other words, the concurrence believes
the only way to achieve the intended purpose the Court in Hoffman is to allow the Board to require
violating employers to award backpay to all workers.
17. Mezonos Maven Bakery, 357 N.L.R.B. at 380. In refuting the Supreme Court’s finding
that other remedies, such as cease-and-desist orders and mandatory violations postings are
sufficient enough to promote the Act, the concurrence states:
Provided it is severe enough, one labor-law violation is all it really takes. The coercive
message—assert your rights, and you will be discharged (and, perhaps, detained and
deported)—will have been sent, and it will not be forgotten. Thus, it makes little
difference that the offending employer will be ordered to cease and desist, and that a
cease-and-desist order will set the stage for contempt penalties should the employer
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consider the possibility of other monetary remedies not inconsistent with the
holding in Hoffman Plastic, such as “a fund to make whole discriminatees whose
backpay the Board had been unable to collect.”18 As it is unlikely that the Court
will entertain additional challenges to the Board’s ability to award back pay to
undocumented workers (even when the employer knowingly hired
undocumented workers in contravention of IRCA), this Comment will expand
on the idea of a common “fund” mentioned in the Mezonos concurrence.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of the Board’s application
of the NLRA to undocumented workers prior to Hoffman Plastic, and a
discussion of how that application changed dramatically after the Court’s
holding in that case. Part II analyzes the effect of the Hoffman Plastic decision
on the ability of the Board to effectuate the policies of the NLRA, as well as the
effectiveness of the goals of IRCA in light of the Court’s holding. Part III
presents the possibility of implementing a common fund as an alternative
solution for money owed to ineligible undocumented workers, and speculates on
the Board’s ability to create such a fund within the confines of its remedial
authority. In support of a common fund, this Comment draws an analogy from
the doctrine of cy pres, where “[a] cy pres distribution puts settlement funds to
their next-best use by providing an indirect benefit to the class.”19 Finally, this
Comment offers concrete statutory language suggestions and amendments that
could be considered by a future Congress interested in achieving the objectives
the NLRA seeks to implement.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE NLRA, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(BOARD), INA, AND IRCA
A. NLRA
The NLRA was passed in 1935 in part as a response to “a wave of labor strikes
and employee uprisings in the early 1930s.”20 In its findings and declaration of
policy, the NLRA states that it seeks to level the bargaining power of employees
and employers in order to prevent burdening the flow of commerce and
depressing workers’ wages.21 Through the right to collectively bargain,
reoffend. For the employer to do so, employees would have to reassert their Section 7
rights. That is highly unlikely. Employees will recall, or will have learned from the lore
of the shop, what happened the last time someone dared do so.
Id.
18. Id. at 384.
19. Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am. Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 475 (5th Cir. 2011).
20. Seitz, supra note 7, at 373.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). The statute further enumerates that the free-flow of commerce
is protected “by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes
arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality
of bargaining power between employers and employees.” Id. The roots of the policy findings are
found in the First Amendment, “by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
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workers’ rights to “freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing” are protected and in turn “eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce.”22 In its
definition of an “employee” as covered under the NLRA, the statute does not
specify a workers’ immigration status, however this ambiguity has been
interpreted inclusively towards undocumented workers.23
1. The Application of the NLRA to Undocumented Workers has Long Been a
Point of Confusion and Conflict
In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B.,24 five employees were deported when their
employer asked the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to inquire into
their immigration status “solely because the employees supported the Union.”25
After the Board determined the company had violated the NLRA, it offered the
workers the traditional remedies of reinstatement and backpay.26 The Court of
Appeals conditioned these remedies, however, on the premise that the workers
demonstrate availability for employment.27 In evaluating the employer’s appeal,
the Supreme Court examined the Board’s interpretation of who is an “employee”
under the NLRA, and affirmed the Board’s practice of extending broad
discretion to include undocumented workers in its construction of the term.28
The Court held that “the task of defining the term ‘employee’ is one that ‘has
been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the
Act.’”29 The Court’s determination in this case upheld the Board’s decision to
award remedies of reinstatement and backpay to five undocumented workers
who were unlawfully fired for engaging in collective bargaining under the

purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.” Id.
22. Id. As the statutorily designated administrative agency to facilitate the Act, the Board has
a degree of enforcement power. As stated by one scholar:
The NLRB’s enforcement power derives from the remedies it may impose against
employers found to have engaged in unfair labor practices. Such remedies include
reinstatement, backpay, cease and desist orders, and post notice orders. The NLRB,
however, does not have the authority to bring complaints of its own volition, rather, it
investigates only official complaints of unfair labor practices filed with its local offices.
Seitz, supra note 7, at 373–74.
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). The statute states “[t]he term ‘employee’ shall include any
employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter
explicitly states otherwise . . . .” Id. See also Logan & Paxton, 55 N.L.R.B. 310, 314, n.12 (1944)
(concluding that the “[NLRA] does not differentiate between citizens and non-citizens.”).
24. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
25. Id. at 888.
26. Id. at 889.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 891.
29. Id. The Court declined to question the Board’s discretion as long as the construction of
the NLRB’s definition of employee “is reasonably defensible.” Id.
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NLRA, on the condition that the workers could prove they were lawfully able to
re-enter the country.30
B. The National Labor Relations Board (Board)
The NLRA vests the administration of promulgating the goals of the NLRA
in the Board.31 One of the primary provisions of the NLRA provides that
employees have the right to collectively bargain and organize “through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
. . . .” 32 If an employer violates any of the rights guaranteed in Section 157 of
the NLRA by engaging in a number of illegal practices described in Section 158
of the NLRA, an employee has the right to file an unfair labor practice charge
against the employer.33 Once an unfair labor practice charge has been brought
before the Board, it is “empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in
any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce” and “shall have power to issue
and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges . . . .”34
1. The NLRA Vests the Board with Broad Discretion to Determine
Appropriate Remedies for Workers Harmed by Employers who Violate the
Statute
In determining the appropriate remedies for an employee whose employer
violated their rights under the NLRA, the Board has broad discretion.35 Section
10(c) of the NLRA “directs the Board ‘to take such affirmative action, including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the
policies of this [Act].’”36 In 1941 in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., the
Supreme Court analyzed the Board’s remedial authority to order the
reinstatement of two employees who were denied employment due to their union
membership and their participation in a strike at the company plant.37 Although
the Court remanded the case to the Board to set forth facts supporting their
contention that the two workers’ new employment was not equivalent to that at
Phelps Dodge, the Court held generally that an order of reinstatement is justified
if the Board deems it necessary to promote industrial peace as sought under the
NLRA.38 The Court emphatically affirmed the discretion of the Board in
30. Seitz, supra note 7, at 377.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158–160 (2012).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2012).
35. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941); see also N.L.R.B. v. Lee
Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1347, 1351 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that if the Board’s remedies can
effectively account for the goals of another statute such that the Board has “reconciled the two
statutes in a reasonable way” then a reviewing court will affirm).
36. Phelps Dodge Corp., 313 U.S. at 188 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012)).
37. Id. at 181–82.
38. Id. at 187–88. In regard to the practice of reinstatement, the Court stated that:
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determining appropriate remedies by stating that “[w]e have no warrant for
speculating on matters of fact the determination of which Congress has entrusted
to the Board. All we are entitled to ask is that the statute speak through the
Board where the statute does not speak for itself.”39 The Court further stated
that “[m]aking the workers whole for losses suffered on account of an unfair
labor practice is part of the vindication of the public policy which the Board
enforces.”40
Two years later, in Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. N.L.R.B., an electric
company challenged the Board’s authority to order backpay and reinstatement
for two workers it discharged in response to their efforts to form a union, in
violation of the NLRA.41 In upholding the Board’s order, the Court emphasized
that it will not disturb the Board’s remedial order unless it clearly does not
effectuate the goals of the NLRA, which are primarily to “encourag[e] and
protect[] collective bargaining and full freedom of association for workers, [and]
the costly dislocation and interruption of the flow of commerce caused by
unnecessary industrial strife and unrest.”42 Here, the Court held that because
there was no such finding that the Board’s order was for any purpose other than
to effectuate the goals of the NLRA, the order requiring back pay and
reinstatement must stand in light of the Board’s informed discretion.43 The
remedies of back pay and reinstatement are not automatically triggered under
the NLRA, but are deployed at the discretion of the Board.44
When the Board exercises its authority, “courts must not enter the allowable
area of the Board’s discretion and must guard against the danger of sliding
unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain
of policy.”45 Such limited judicial review is imperative if the Board is to meet
the goals of the NLRA. The Board “draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise
all its own, and its choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect by

Reinstatement is the conventional correction for discriminatory discharges. Experience
having demonstrated that discrimination in hiring is twin to discrimination in firing, it
would indeed be surprising if Congress gave a remedy for the one which it denied for the
other. The powers of the Board as well as the restrictions upon it must be drawn from §
10(c), which directs the Board “to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement
of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act.”
Id.
39. Id. at 195–96.
40. Id. at 197.
41. Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. N.L.R.B., 319 U.S. 533, 534 (1943).
42. Id. at 539.
43. Id. at 540.
44. Phelps Dodge Corp., 313 U.S. at 198. The Court again stresses that “[a]ttainment of a
great national policy through expert administration in collaboration with limited judicial review
must not be confined within narrow canons for equitable relief deemed suitable by chancellors in
ordinary private controversies.” Id. at 188.
45. Id. at 194.
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reviewing courts.”46 This Supreme Court precedent has been unwaveringly
upheld for the past several decades and in numerous binding decisions.47 For
example, twelve years after the decision in Phelps Dodge, the Court upheld the
Board’s order of reinstatement and backpay for eleven discriminatorily
discharged employees in N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Company of Miami.48
The Court held that “the power, which is a broad discretionary one, is for the
Board to wield, not for the courts.”49 The Court went on to discuss the Board’s
unique position to fashion remedies based on its experience and consideration
of “every socially desirable factor” in the “mitigation of damages” stating that
“the Board must draw on enlightenment gained from experience.”50 Although
courts must defer to the discretion of the Board, the affirmative authority may
not amount to punitive action against a violating employer, but only remedial
awards aimed at making workers whole.51

46. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 153 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
47. See Nat’l Licorice Co. v. N.L.R.B., 309 U.S. 350, 362–63 (1940) (finding that the Board’s
authorization under the NLRA is not for the adjudication of private rights, but for the promulgation
of the public policy of the Act, and the statute itself provides the Board with authority to take
affirmative remedial actions to meet this end); Phelps Dodge Corp., 313 U.S. at 194–96 (finding
that the Act “entrusts to an expert agency the maintenance and promotion of industrial peace” and
that the Court has “no warrant for speculating on matters of fact the determination of which
Congress has entrusted to the Board.”); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203,
216 (1964) (applying Supreme Court precedent to find that “[t]he relation of remedy to policy is
peculiarly a matter for administrative competence.”); N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
575, 612–14 (1969) (holding that the Board’s bargaining order was not an “unnecessarily harsh
remedy” in deterring an employer’s Section 7 violations based on their remedial authority to
effectuate the NLRA); N.L.R.B. v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 263 (1969) (holding
that backpay awards serve critically important remedial purposes); N.L.R.B. v. S.E. Nichols, Inc.,
862 F.2d 952, 960 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that the Board’s remedial authority is “subject to limited
judicial review”); but see N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257 (1939)
(finding that the broad discretion attributed to the Board to fashion remedies under the NLRA “is
not unlimited”). In a concise summary of what the Board must take into consideration, practitioners
have stated that:
It is for the NLRB and not the courts to make the determination of what remedy is
appropriate for a violation of the NLRA sections prohibiting an interference with
employees’ organizing rights and refusing to bargain collectively based on its expert
estimate as to the effects on the election process of unfair labor practices of varying
intensity. In fashioning the remedy for such a violation, the NLRB should take into
account the extensiveness of the employer’s unfair practices in terms of their past effect
on election conditions and the likelihood of their recurrence in the future; if the Board
determines that the possibility of erasing the past practices and of ensuring a fair election
by the use of traditional remedies is slight, then a bargaining order should issue.
51A C.J.S. Labor Relations § 826.
48. N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
49. Id. at 346.
50. Id.
51. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 235–36 (1938).

2019]

Alternative Remedies for Undocumented Workers

765

C. Immigration Nationality Act
The Immigration Nationality Act (INA) was passed in 1952 in order to
enumerate cohesively the nation’s various immigration laws governing the
entrance of migrants to the United States.52 For whatever reason, Congress
failed to include any section making it unlawful to employ an undocumented
immigrant.53 For many years, the rights and remedies of undocumented workers
in the work force went unaddressed in legislation.54
D. Immigration Reform and Control Act
In 1986, shortly after the decision in Sure-Tan, Congress passed IRCA as an
official amendment to the INA.55 While IRCA did not directly address the
contention between undocumented workers and the NLRA, it did fill the gap left
by the INA regarding the employment of undocumented workers.56 The statute
added the language that made it “unlawful for a person or other entity to hire, or
to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing
the alien is an unauthorized alien.”57 The goal in adding this language was to
slow illegal immigration by deterring employers from seeking low-cost,
immigrant labor.58 Therefore, despite the additions to IRCA, courts remained
divided over the applicability of the NLRA to undocumented workers and the
best way to harmonize these two statutes.

52. Seitz, supra note 7, at 372–73.
53. Id. at 373.
54. Until the implementation of IRCA 34 years later, the Supreme Court’s holding in SureTan remained governing law, providing “considerable deference” to the Board’s consideration of
the term “employee” under the NLRA. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 497 U.S. 883, 891 (1984). So
long as the Board’s interpretation of an employee under the NLRA was “reasonably defensible,” it
was not to be disturbed. Id.
55. Seitz, supra note 7, at 380.
56. Id.
57. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2012). In addition, the statute “established a verification
system that requires employers to validate the work eligibility of every potential employee before
hiring.” Seitz, supra note 7, at 380.
58. Seitz, supra note 7, at 380.
Despite restrictive immigration statutes such as the IRCA in 1986 and the PRWORA in
1996, the INS has recently estimated that some 350,000 persons immigrate illegally to
the United States annually. See Immigration and Naturalization Service, Executive
Summary: Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United
States: 1990 to 2000, Jan. 31, 2003, available at http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/
shared/aboutus/statistics/2000ExecSumm.pdf [hereinafter Estimates of the Unauthorized
Immigrant Population] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Marcus Stern,
Number Put at 8 million; Growth Rate Is Increased, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 31,
2003, at A1.
Id. at n.91.
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E. From Policy to Conflict to Harmony
1. Prior to Hoffman Plastic, the Board Routinely Extended Traditional
Remedies of Backpay and Reinstatement to Undocumented Workers
Prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Hoffman Plastic, the Board
consistently held that undocumented workers were eligible for reinstatement and
back pay awards under the NLRA.59 This precedent followed the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sure-Tan that “the Act’s policies ‘fully support’ the view
that undocumented aliens are employees under Section 2(3) of the [NLRA]. . .
.”60 In its analysis, the Court stressed that by not allowing undocumented
workers to participate in protected union activities, “there would be created a
subclass of workers without a comparable stake in the collective goals of their
legally resident co-workers, thereby eroding the unity of all the employees and
impeding collective bargaining.”61 Therefore, considering that “Congress has
vested the Board with broad authority to remedy unfair labor practices,” the
Board was vindicated in its practice of awarding remedies of reinstatement and
back pay to all workers in light of employer violations.62

59. See Cty. Window Cleaning Co., 328 N.L.R.B. 190, 200 (1999) (ordering that the
undocumented worker should be reinstated as his employer possessed knowledge of his
undocumented status and should therefore not preclude the worker from being made whole); Belle
Knitting Mills, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 80, 101 (2000) (asserting that “[t]he law is clear that
undocumented aliens fall within the statutory definition of ‘employee’ under the Act.”). In
affirming the Board’s finding that undocumented workers are considered “employees” within the
meaning of the Act, the Court stated that:
The terms and policies of the [NLRA] fully support the Board’s interpretation in this
case. The breadth of § 2(3)’s definition is striking: the Act squarely applies to “any
employee.” The only limitations are specific exemptions for agricultural laborers,
domestic workers, individuals employed by their spouses or parents, individuals
employed as independent contractors or supervisors, and individuals employed by a
person who is not an employer under the NLRA. Since undocumented aliens are not
among the few groups of workers expressly exempted by Congress, they plainly come
within the broad statutory definition of “employee.”
Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891–92.
60. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408, 411 (1995).
61. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892.
62. A.P.R.A Fuel, 320 N.L.R.B. at 410. The Board discusses the specific language of the
NLRA, saying that:
Section 10(c) of the [NLRA] directs the Board, upon finding that an unfair labor practice
has been committed, to issue “an order requiring such person to cease and desist from
such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of
employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of [the] [NLRA].”
Id. See also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) (finding that “[t]he exercise
of the process was committed to the Board . . . [b]ecause the relation of remedy to policy is
peculiarly a matter for administrative competence.”).
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2. The NLRA and IRCA can be Enacted in Unison and Advance Congress’
Policy Objectives
In response to arguments that the practice of awarding backpay and
reinstatement to undocumented workers undermines IRCA, the Board
contended that its practices allow both the NLRA and IRCA to be enacted in
harmony. In A.P.R.A Fuel, the Board argued that the NLRA and IRCA have
“virtually identical policy objectives with respect to the American workplace.”63
The Board further stated that “Congress has expressly indicated that the policies
underlying these statutes reinforce each other.”64 Thus, the Board determined
that in the case at hand, the undocumented workers who were unlawfully
terminated for engaging in union activity, should receive the traditional Board
remedies of reinstatement and back pay as long as “such enforcement does not
require or encourage unlawful conduct by either employers or individuals.”65
This, the Board stated, would allow them to “best achieve th[e] mutuality of
purpose and effect [between the NLRA and IRCA] by vigorously enforcing the
NLRA.”66 As discussed in Section I.B.1., while the Board maintains deference
to interpret the NLRA, “it has been said that the Board’s interpretation of the
INA is entitled to no deference at all.”67
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the Court affirmed the Board’s application
of awarding back pay and reinstatement to the aggrieved workers.68 After
examining the legislative intent of the employment provisions in IRCA, the
Court concluded that it was clear Congress’ “intent [was] to focus on employers,
not employees, in deterring unlawful employment relationships.”69 Focusing on
the Judiciary Committee report, the Court also noted “that IRCA was not
intended to limit” in any way the scope of the term ‘employee’ under the Act.70
Applying these findings in conjunction with the Board’s inherently discretionary

63. A.P.R.A Fuel, 320 N.L.R.B. at 411.
64. Id.
65. Id. The Board further based its discretionary authority on Congressional reports
indicating Congress’ intent, stating that:
The legislative history of IRCA provides the Board with explicit guidance in our
endeavor to fulfill our own mandate under the NLRA without impeding congressional
intent as expressed in other statutes. Congress clearly directed the Board to persist in
applying the protections and remedies of the Act to employees, including those hired
despite their lack of authorization to enter the United States or to work here. As the
House Report emphasized, “as long as job opportunities are available to undocumented
aliens, the intense pressure to surreptitiously enter this country or violate status once
admitted as a nonimmigrant in order to obtain employment will continue.”
Id. at 414.
66. Id. at 411.
67. N.L.R.B. v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., Inc., 134 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1997).
68. Id. at 56.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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powers,
the
Court
held
“that the Board’s remedies do not conflict with the requirements of IRCA.”71
3. The Board’s Reversal of an Administrative Law Judge’s Decision to Deny
an Undocumented Worker Backpay Sparked Push-Back Leading to Hoffman
Plastic
On this precedent, the Board reversed an Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ)
decision denying a back pay award to a former employee of Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc.72 Jose Castro was laid off by the company in retaliation for
his involvement in a union organizing campaign at the company’s production
plant.73 At the compliance hearing to determine the amount of back pay Castro
should receive from the company, Castro admitted that he fraudulently obtained
employment with Hoffman by producing a fabricated driver’s license and social
security card.74 The ALJ found that awarding Castro back pay or reinstatement
would be “contrary to Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, and in conflict with IRCA, which
makes it unlawful for . . . employees to use fraudulent documents to establish
employment eligibility.”75 On review following its decision in A.P.R.A Fuel,
the Board determined that the “protections and remedies of the [NLRA]” should
be extended to Castro as an undocumented worker “in the same manner as to
other employees.”76
4. Hoffman Plastic Reversed Board Precedent and Effectively Undermined
the Goals of the NLRA in Favor of a Strict Statutory Interpretation of the
IRCA
In response to this decision, Hoffman Plastics appealed to the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, who affirmed the Board’s decision.77 The
company then petitioned for, and was granted, review by the Supreme Court of

71. Id. The Second Circuit reinforced the Board’s reasoning in its decision to award the two
employees conditional reinstatement and backpay. The Board stated that:
To do otherwise would increase the incentives for some unscrupulous employers to play
the provisions of the NLRA and IRCA against each other to defeat the fundamental
objectives of each, while profiting from their own wrongdoing with relative impunity.
Thus, these employers would be free to flout their obligations under the Act, secure in
the knowledge that the Board would be powerless fully to remedy their violations.
Id. at 57.
72. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 141 (2002).
73. Id. at 140.
74. Id. at 141.
75. Id.
76. Id. The Court stated that “[s]ince the Board’s inception, we have consistently set aside
awards of reinstatement or backpay to employees found guilty of serious illegal conduct in
connection with their employment.” Id. at 143. Therefore, the Court seemed to make its finding
primarily on the basis that Castro had broken the law.
77. Id. at 142.
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the United States.78 While the Court acknowledged the Board’s generally broad
discretion in determining appropriate remedies for violations of the NLRA, it
also noted that this discretion is not unlimited.79 The Court relied on its dicta in
Sure-Tan that the Board’s practice of awarding back pay to undocumented
workers “runs counter to policies underlying IRCA, policies the Board has no
authority to enforce or administer.”80 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
discussed prior holdings rejecting remedial awards to employees committing
illegal acts and others where the Board’s “remedial preferences . . . potentially
trench upon federal statutes and policies unrelated to the NLRA.”81
Conversely, the dissent authored by Justice Breyer strongly disagreed with the
majority and came to the opposite conclusion on the effect of the Board’s
practice of awarding backpay.82 It determined that such a remedy was instead
“necessary; it helps make labor law enforcement credible; it makes clear that
violating the labor laws will not pay.”83 Further, the dissent argued that by not
requiring employers who knowingly violate immigration and labor laws to award
backpay, the “magnetic force” of illegal immigration will instead be
strengthened.84 When an employer’s incentives to adhere to the employment
laws of IRCA and the labor laws of the NLRA are diminished by an absence of
effective deterrents, the goals of both IRCA and the NLRA are undermined and
American workers jeopardized.85 Therefore, this holding abrogated the Board’s
78. Id.
79. Id. at 142–43.
80. Id. at 149; see also Southern S.S. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 316 U.S. 31, 48 (1942). The Court
expressed its reservation with upholding an administrative agency’s authority when its award
essentially endorses unlawful activity and stated that:
We cannot ignore the fact that the strike was unlawful from its very inception. It directly
contravened the policy of Congress as expressed in §§ 292 and 293, and it was more than
a “technical” violation of those provisions. Consequently, and despite the initial unfair
labor practice which caused the strike, we hold that the reinstatement provisions of the
order exceeded the Board’s authority to make such requirements “as will effectuate the
policies of the Act.”
Id.
81. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 144.
82. Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer emphatically states:
I cannot agree that the backpay award before use “runs counter to,” or “trenches upon,”
national immigration policy . . . . As all the relevant agencies . . . have told us, the
National Labor Relations Board’s limited backpay order will not interfere with the
implementation of immigration policy. Rather, it reasonably helps to deter unlawful
activity that both labor laws and immigration laws seek to prevent.
Id. Justice Breyer is joined in his dissent by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id.
83. Id. at 154.
84. Id. at 155.
85. See id., 153–54. Justice Breyer stressed that:
[w]ithout the possibility of the deterrence that backpay provides, the Board can impose
only future-oriented obligations upon law-violating employers—for it has no other
weapons in its remedial arsenal. And in the absence of the backpay weapon, employers
could conclude that they can violate the labor laws at least once with impunity.
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long-term precedent of exercising its remedial discretion to extend reinstatement
and back pay to undocumented workers and, further, changed the ability of the
NLRA to protect a rapidly growing group of workers in America.
5. The Wake of the Holding in Hoffman Plastic and the Board’s Reluctant
Adherence to New Guidelines Led to the Idea of Alternative Remedies
Several years later, in an effort to test Justice Breyer’s dissent in the Hoffman
Plastic decision that the rule barring undocumented workers from backpay and
reinstatement would not apply to a scenario where an employer knowingly hired
an undocumented worker, employees and advocates brought a case before the
Board where the employer initially hired the workers knowing they were
undocumented.86 The effort failed, and in Mezonos Maven Bakery, the Board
held that Hoffman Plastic barred backpay, even in the case of an employer who
knowingly violates immigration laws.87
This holding, however, led to the concurring opinion by former Board
Chairwoman Wilma Liebman and then-Member Mark Pearce, in which they
expanded on the dissent in Hoffman Plastic by delineating four specific harms
inevitable to workers regardless of immigration status:
“Precluding backpay undermines enforcement of the Act;”88
“Precluding backpay chills the exercise of Section 7 rights;”89
“Precluding backpay fragments the work force and upsets the balance
of power between employers and employees;”90 and
“Precluding backpay removes a vital check on workplace abuses.”91
Further, Liebman and Pearce agree with Justice Breyers’ dissent, stating that
“wrong doing employers liable for backpay to undocumented discriminatees not
only does not conflict with IRCA’s purposes, it supports them.”92
Although Liebman and Pearce acknowledge the Board’s confined authority
under the Supreme Court’s holding in Hoffman Plastic, they introduce the issue
raised by this Comment, stating that “we would be willing to consider in a future
case any remedy within our statutory powers that would prevent an employer
that discriminates against undocumented workers because of their protected
activity from being unjustly enriched by its unlawful conduct.” 93 Whether or

Id. at 154.
86. See Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 376, 376 (2011).
87. Id. at 377–78.
88. Id. at 380.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 381.
91. Id. at 382.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 384. In a Supplemental Decision to the initial holding in Mezonos, the Board
addressed the question of conditional reinstatement for undocumented workers and concluded that
“Hoffman ‘did not cast doubt on the use of conditional reinstatement in cases involving
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not a remedy falls within the Board’s remedial, statutory powers, will hinge on
analyzing precedent, relevant statutes, and interpreting legislative intent.
II. ANALYZING THE EFFECTS OF HOFFMAN PLASTIC ON THE NLRA AND IRCA
A. When Employers Knowingly Violate the Employment Provisions in IRCA,
Both the NLRA and IRCA are Undermined
The general policy goal of the NLRA, to protect workers by leveling the
playing field between employer and employee, and the aim to deter illegal
immigration through the employment provision added to the INA by IRCA,94
are both undermined when employers knowingly hire undocumented workers.
Prior to the holding in Hoffman Plastic, the Board discussed a Congressional
report that demonstrated findings of the consequences when undocumented
workers’ labor rights are violated. The Board summarized that:
the willingness of many illegal immigrants to accept low wages and
substandard conditions makes them attractive to some employers who
are ready to “exploit [them as a] source of labor” often to the detriment
of United States workers whose wages are depressed or whose jobs
are lost.95
This report shows that not only are undocumented workers treated as a sub-class
when employers intentionally seek to take advantage of their status, or lack
thereof, but also that documented workers’ conditions are simultaneously
undermined.96
Post-Hoffman Plastic, undocumented workers are still entitled to bring a claim
under the NLRA, but the only remedy available in such cases is injunctive, and
undocumented workers are not eligible to be made whole from their alleged
harm.97 In fact, the effects of Hoffman Plastic essentially “remov[e] any real
consequences for an NLRA violation” against the employer.98 By simply
undocumented discriminatees,’ and held that ‘conditional reinstatement is important in the
immigration context in order to provide a meaningful remedy for the Respondent’s unfair labor
practices.’” Steven M. Swirsky, NLRB Reiterates its Position that Undocumented Workers are
Entitled to “Conditional Reinstatement” in Unfair Labor Practice Cases, EPSTEIN BECKER GREEN
(May 20, 2015), https://www.managementmemo.com/2015/05/20/nlrb-reiterates-its-position-thatundocumented-workers-are-entitled-to-conditional-reinstatement-in-unfair-labor-practice-cases/.
94. See Eduardo Rivero, American Workers Must Settle for Less When Undocumented
Workers are Protected Less: The Uphill Battle Facing Undocumented Workers and How
Immigration Law is Reigning in Workers’ Rights, 5 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 53, 58–59 (2015).
95. N.L.R.B. v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., 134 F.3d 50, 55–56 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5651, 5656, 5662).
96. See 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5653.
97. Seitz, supra note 7, at 387–88. Employers are only required to post “cease and desist”
orders, which only require a posting of the violation. Id. at 387. This meager directive is hardly
remedial and likely fails to deter employers from hiring undocumented workers, making their
employment “a cost-effective business practice.” Id. at 387–88.
98. Id. at 388.
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viewing the firing of undocumented workers for engaging in protected activity
under the NLRA as an immigration issue, the Hoffman Plastic Court essentially
ignored the workers’ rights issues.99
The Court failed to consider that such a holding instead results in the opposite
effect intended by IRCA, as it encourages the pull of illegal immigration and
emboldens employers by assuring them that labor laws will not be enforced
against all types of workers.100 This has created the presence of a sub-class of
workers not entitled to labor protections, thereby contributing to the downward
trend of overall wages and working conditions.101
B. Hoffman Plastic Unfairly Focuses on Punishing Employees for Working
Without Documentation Without Seeking to Deter and Hold Violating
Employers Accountable
In holding that undocumented workers are not entitled to the same remedies
as all other workers when their labor rights are violated, the Court has
“essentially declared the enforcement of immigration regulations more
important than the right of a worker to organize and work collectively for
improved working conditions . . . .”102 The Court seemingly made this
determination outside any indication of legislative intent from IRCA as “the
statute’s language itself does not explicitly state how a violation is to effect the
enforcement of other laws, such as labor laws.”103 In fact, when IRCA was
initially enacted, it did not make it unlawful for an undocumented worker to
accept employment, but focused instead on sanctioning employers for violations
of the statute.104 By its facial language, as well as its requirements that
employers verify the legal employment of their workers, it can be interpreted
that “the primary purpose of the IRCA is to make it more difficult to employ
undocumented workers by providing severe penalties to employers who offer
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356–57 (1976). The Court stated that “acceptance
by illegal aliens of jobs on substandard terms as to wages and working conditions can seriously
depress wage scales and working conditions of citizens and legally admitted aliens; and
employment of illegal aliens under such conditions can diminish the effectiveness of labor unions.”
Id.
102. Seitz, supra note 7, at 390. In light of these findings, “[t]he Court’s ruling established
that if a remedy issued by the NLRB seriously conflicts with federal policies unrelated to the
NLRB’s objections, the remedy must be adjusted to conform to the federal policies.” Id. See also
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 157 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that, in reading excepts of legislative hearings, it is clear that Congress did not intend for
the immigration statute to take away from any power vested to the Board to effectuate remedies
under the Act); N.L.R.B. v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (opining that in order for the Board to uphold the policies of the NLRA, they must be
able to actually enforce the labor laws, and denying them this ability “would leave helpless the very
persons who most need protection from exploitative employer practices”).
103. Seitz, supra note 7, at 391.
104. Rivero, supra note 94, at 59.
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the undocumented jobs.”105 With this interpretation, the Court haphazardly
endorsed penalizing the employment of undocumented workers at the expense
of upholding and protecting labor rights for documented and undocumented
workers alike.
C. Previously Proposed Alternative Remedies Fail to Adequately Assess Their
Legality within the Board’s Discretionary Authority
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman Plastic, scholars
began proposing alternative solutions to protect the legitimacy of the NLRA and
the Board’s established remedies for undocumented workers.106 Although the
Court in Hoffman Plastic found that undocumented workers were not eligible
recipients for back pay under the NLRA,107 it was silent on the possibility of
awarding this money to alternative recipients.108 When it comes to the
relationship between the NLRA and the IRCA, it is clear that the solution does
not have to be so narrow as for one to preclude the other.
In his article, Union Shops, Not Border Stops: Updating NLRB Sanctions to
Help Organize Immigrant Workers After Hoffman, Peter Shapiro suggests using
the money owed to discriminated undocumented workers to fund immigrant
worker groups.109 Groups can then “use[] the money to promote the workers’
collective voice—thereby promoting the well-being of the entire community.”110
Shapiro argues that requiring the money to instead benefit community activism
groups or unions specifically organizing immigrant workers will “ensure
fairness and foster worker participation.”111 He argues that awarding backpay
to immigrant worker groups avoids disrupting the holding in Hoffman Plastic as
the award would not go directly to an undocumented worker.112 Therefore, such

105. Id. at 58.
106. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 1070; Seitz, supra note 7, at 371; Rivero, supra note 94, at
56–57. Note that none of these articles analyze the possibility of a common fund proposed by
former Chairperson Liebman and then-Member Pearce. Rivero poignantly points out that “[t]here
are approximately eleven million undocumented people in the United States. Around eight million
of these undocumented people are part of the nation’s workforce . . . [and] still represent[] three
times the population in 1990.” Rivero, supra note 94, at 56.
107. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 151–52.
108. See id.
109. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 1081.
110. Id. Shapiro points out that:
Enjoyment of these diffuse benefits and recognition that the award could benefit those
close to the wronged employee would help to minimize the unfairness of an alternativerecipient scheme. Concededly, unfairness is created by the preclusion of backpay from
the Hoffman decision and it cannot be entirely ameliorated by a proposal consistent with
the case.
Id.
111. Id. at 1081.
112. Id.
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an alternative will remind all workers that they have collective rights under the
NLRA and encourage the reporting of employer wrongdoings.113
As the NLRA does not specifically allow for punitive damages, the Supreme
Court has interpreted this omission as affirmative of the preclusion of the
Board’s authority to assess punitive damages and fines.114 One of the main goals
of requiring violating employers to award backpay to an alternative recipient is
to “preserve backpay’s disincentive for employers to fire unauthorized workers
for protected union activities, and so protect labor law goals.”115 As this goal is
“aimed primarily at deterring employer conduct, [and] not at making employees
whole,”116 alternative remedial solutions must walk the fine line of upholding
the goals of the NLRA within the Board’s authority without crossing into the
sphere of punitive sanctions.
Though Shapiro addresses these concerns, he does not fully analyze his
proposed alternatives and how they might arguably maintain the NLRA’s
remedial nature of making victims of discrimination whole. While his
suggestions ensure compliance with Hoffman Plastic, if alternative solutions are
to pass muster as legitimate and legal proposals, they must also arguably fall
within the Board’s broad authority to prescribe remedies. Without this nuanced
analysis, proposed remedies might otherwise be read through a punitive lens and
found outside the scope of the Board’s authority and the purposes of the NLRA.
Alternatively, if proposed solutions are not deemed punitive, they might still run
the risk of failing to adequately provide a direct remedy for the individual
113. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 1082. Shapiro also suggests as alternative recipients,
government institutions and, in particular, government efforts at immigration enforcement. Id. at
1082–83. Congress summarized the purpose of the Act by stating that:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). With this purpose in mind, by not extending the Board’s remedial power
to cover undocumented workers, the Supreme Court is taking a short-sighted approach to the goals
of the NLRA and undermining the Board’s authority to protect workers under the Act.
114. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 1075. These proposals fail, however, to adequately address the
harm suffered by the immigrant worker community caused by Hoffman Plastic. Additionally, the
proposal to award backpay to enforce immigration laws would not only directly hurt undocumented
workers, but would disincentivize reporting of unfair labor practices and hamper workers’ efforts
to organize collectively. Id. Shapiro acknowledges that “[a]n award of backpay to an alternative
recipient would likely require congressional action to change the NLRA because, like punitive
damages and fines, it is aimed primarily at deterring employer conduct, not at making employees
whole.” Id.
115. Id. at 1074. Shapiro discusses the possibility of alternative remedies in an attempt to
honor the goals of both labor and immigration laws, rather than to view these respective federal
laws in conflict, as the Supreme Court appears to do in Hoffman Plastic. Id. at 1074–75.
116. Id. at 1075.
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harmed. The following section seeks to raise possible alternative remedies, and
analyzes the likelihood these solutions will be found within the Board’s remedial
statutory authority.
III. FIXING THE PROBLEM: HARMONIZING THE GOALS OF THE NLRA AND
IRCA WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY STRENGTHENING THE UNITED STATES
WORKFORCE
As the demographics in the United States workforce continues to grow in
percentage of minorities and immigrants,117 the potential for workplace abuses
will continue to rise. Therefore, it is important that the Board is able to
promulgate the goals of the NLRA lest its purpose be forgotten entirely. With a
growing workforce, especially one involving such vulnerable groups of people,
the NLRA’s principal policy purpose of “fostering collective bargaining through
unionization”118 is in jeopardy when the Board is unable to ameliorate violations
of the NLRA in a uniform fashion for all employees. New alternative remedies
for workers harmed in violation of laws are therefore imperative to the strength
of labor laws under the NLRA and the Board must be creative in applying its
enforcement discretion. In justifying the Board’s broad authority, the Supreme
Court has held:
We prefer to deal with these realities and to avoid entering into the
bog of logomachy, as we are invited to, by debate about what is
“remedial” and what is “punitive.” It seems more profitable to stick
closely to the direction of the [NLRA] by considering what order does,
as this does, and what order does not, bear appropriate relation to the
policies of the Act.119
Further, the Court has stressed that “in devising a remedy the Board is not
confined to the record of a particular proceeding” and “[t]he relation of remedy
to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence.”120 Therefore, in
its sole purpose to enforce the NLRA, the Board is permitted to fashion broad
remedies, not necessarily those applicable to individual cases, that will uphold
and advance the purposes of the NLRA.121 The ability of the Board to shift the
117. See Labor Force Projections to 2022: The Labor Force Participation Rate Continues to
Fall, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.: MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Dec. 2013),
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/article/labor-force-projections-to-2022-the-labor-forceparticipation-rate-continues-to-fall.htm.
118. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 1082.
119. N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1953).
120. Id. at 349; see also Chi., B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598 (1907) (holding
that “[t]he Board was created for the purpose of using its judgment and its knowledge . . . [w]ithin
its jurisdiction, except . . . in the case of fraud or a clearly shown adoption of wrong principals, it
is the ultimate guardian of certain rights”).
121. See Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, 344 U.S. at 349. The Court states that:
in devising a remedy, the Board is not confined to the record of a particular proceeding.
“Cumulative experience” begets understanding and insight by which judgments not
objectively demonstrable are validated or qualified or invalidated. The constant process
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recipient of damages owed to an aggrieved undocumented worker to a qualifying
recipient with an insolvent employer is within the Board’s discretion to
effectuate the broader policies of the NLRA.122
A. The Creation of a Common Fund for Workers Unpaid by Insolvent
Employers is Within the Board’s Discretionary Remedial Authority
The first solution to remedying undocumented workers whose labor rights
have been violated is through the concept of a common fund. As former
Chairwoman Liebman briefly mentioned in the concurring opinion in Mezonos,
the Board:
do[es] not definitely shut the door on other monetary remedies, which
have not been tested here. It is arguable, for example, that a remedy
that requires payment by the employer of backpay equivalent to what
it would have owed to an undocumented discriminatee would not only
be consistent with Hoffman, but would advance Federal labor and
immigration policy objectives. Such backpay could be paid, for
example, into a fund to make whole discriminatees whose backpay the
Board had been unable to collect.123
The Board, therefore, has opened the door to litigation proposing the concept of
a common fund, so long as such solution is within the confines of the Board’s
statutory power.124
In a common fund, violating employers would pay back pay awards into a
general pool rather than directly to victims of discrimination. This payment
would trigger at the compliance stage of a Board proceeding and only after it
has been determined that the actual victim of discrimination is ineligible for
backpay or reinstatement. The money in the pool would then be distributed to
workers eligible for backpay awards, but who had not been paid for whatever
reason—most likely due to the insolvency of the offending employer. While not
directly benefitting the ineligible, undocumented worker, the remedial purposes
of the NLRA could still be effectuated by making whole other aggrieved workers
who had not yet received backpay. As previously referenced, one remedy
clearly within the Board’s discretionary power is the ability to require employers

of trial and error, on a wider and fuller scale than a single adversary litigation permits,
differentiates perhaps more than anything else the administrative from the judicial
process . . . peculiarly a matter for administrative competence.
Id. (citing Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941)).
122. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, 344 U.S. at 349–52.
123. Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 376, 384 (2011).
124. Id. The Board stated that “we would be willing to consider in a future case any remedy
within our statutory powers that would prevent an employer that discriminates against
undocumented workers because of their protected activity from being unjustly enriched by its
unlawful conduct.” Id.
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to pay backpay awards,125 and the idea of a common fund is arguably only a step
away from traditional direct backpay awards. This solution does not contravene
the holding of Hoffman Plastic, and it ensures that undocumented workers do
not directly receive backpay. Moreover, it does not punitively fine an employer
for its labor law violations, but instead makes use of funds that an employer
would ordinarily be required to pay if the employee was eligible for the backpay
award.
1. Current Board Precedents Provide Legal Rationales from Which a
Common Fund can Logically Flow
While a common fund that consists of monetary awards not directed to a
particular employee might be considered punitive, there is current Board
precedent from which this proposal could logically flow. For example, in jointemployer cases, the Board has held that employees under the control of more
than one employer maintain rights against each, who are in turn jointly and
severally liable for any damages caused for violating the NLRA.126 In Adams &
Associates, where one employer claimed to not know its counterpart committed
unfair labor practices, the Board reiterated its standard that liability is
appropriate even if one employer was unaware of the unlawful acts committed
by the other.127 On this standard, there would be no dispute that, because of two
employers’ joint responsibility to an employee, that one employer would be fully
responsible for the others unlawful acts. This liability would also extend to a
situation in which the “aggrieving” employer becomes insolvent, thereby
requiring the “innocent” employer to pay the entirety of an award to employee,
solely based on their joint and several liability.
Similar to a common fund, and arguably only a step beyond the Board’s
authority to hold employers jointly and severally liable, is the possibility for
employees contracted under a multi-employer bargaining unit to create a
common fund for backpay within the unit.128 The Supreme Court has long
125. F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289 (1950). In this case, the Board found that the
company illegally discriminated against the employee “because of her union affiliation and
activities” in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. Id. at 291. The Board determined that the
appropriate remedy for the harmed employee is “immediate reinstatement to her former or
substantially equivalent position without prejudice to her seniority and other rights and privileges,
and to make her whole for any loss of pay she may have suffered as a result of the Respondent’s
discrimination against her.” Id. In discussing the best way to calculate an appropriate back pay
award, the Board emphasized the policy behind its ability to award remedies, finding “[t]he public
interest in discouraging obstacles to industrial peace requires that we seek to bring about, in unfair
labor practice cases, ‘a restoration of the situation, as nearly as possible, to that which would have
obtained but for the illegal discrimination.’” Id. at 292.
126. See generally Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (2015).
127. See generally Adams & Assocs., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 193 (2016).
128. Logically, a step further from this authority is the possibility for the Board to award
damages to victims of discrimination for consequential damages suffered as a result of the loss of
their employment. In a Board decision and order from 2016, the General Counsel sought “a make
whole remedy that includes reasonable consequential damages incurred as a result of the
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acknowledged the Board’s authority to certify multi-employer bargaining units,
determining that “Congress intended ‘that the Board should continue its
established administrative practice of certifying multi-employer units, and
intended to leave to the Board’s specialized judgment the inevitable questions
concerning multi-employer bargaining bound to arise in the future.’”129 The
Court recognized Congress’ findings that multi-employer bargaining units could
serve as “a vital factor in the effectuation of the national policy of promoting
labor peace through strengthened collective bargaining,”130 which is one of the
tasks the Board is charged to uphold under the NLRA.
Multi-employer units are generally common in the construction industry, with
employers from a particular trade sharing mutual employment contracts with
other employers of the same trade.131 Because of the frequency in which
workers oscillate from one employer within the unit to another, it seems sensible
to require that participating employers create a common fund for the industry.
In the event that one member of the unit commits an unfair labor practice, and
is unable to pay the aggrieved worker, the employee could still be made whole
from the multi-employer unit common fund. If the Board could justifiably
authorize a common fund, it is not far off to require single employers, who have
violated the NLRA, to pay into a common fund to benefit workers awaiting
backpay awards.
From a policy perspective, the use of a common fund in cases where awards
cannot directly benefit an undocumented worker logically flows from the
Board’s established authority to dictate the parameters of joint-employer and
multi-employer bargaining unit cases. Moreover, a common fund promotes a
similar spirit to joint and multi-employer cases: at times, the NLRA’s goal of
maintaining industrial peace and equalizing the bargaining power between
employers and employees means more than upholding responsibility to an
employer’s own employees.
A common fund is distinguishable from Shapiro’s suggestion of awarding
backpay money to community organizing groups. In his proposal, money
intended for undocumented workers would go towards some type of
organization with a nexus to immigrant communities, rather than to actual
victims of discrimination under the NLRA.132 Because a common fund would
directly help remedy the wrongs a worker suffered due to an employer’s labor
law violations, it is more likely to pass legal muster as an alternative to the
Respondents’ unfair labor practices.” Goodman Logistics, LLC, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 177, at n.2
(2016). In response, the Board declined to directly address this proposed remedy as this type of
“relief sought would involve a change in Board law.” Id. The Board, however, did not decide
against this possibility, but instead stated that “the appropriateness of th[is] proposed remed[y]
should be resolved after a full briefing by the affected parties.” Id.
129. N.L.R.B. v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 499, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957).
130. Id. at 95.
131. Id. at 94–95.
132. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 1081–82.
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problems Hoffman Plastic raises. And, importantly, such a fund remains in the
permissible sphere of requiring a remedial award, rather than a punitive fine.
2. The Equitable Doctrine of Cy Pres Provides Further Legal Justification
for a Common Fund
The common fund suggested here is analogous to the doctrine of cy pres as
applied to trust law. Although cy pres is not ordinarily present in traditional
labor law jurisprudence, its underlying equitable concepts can rationally extend
to backpay awards paid into a common fund. In other areas of law, where the
doctrine has been deemed applicable, courts often point to the general rule of
charitable intent.133 Cy pres is recognized if “the instrument indicates a general
intention or dominant purpose on the part of the donor that the property to be
devoted to charitable purposes regardless of the peculiar method of
execution.”134 In awarding back pay, the Board promulgates the purposes of the
NLRA, which is the underlying intent behind such a monetary award.
In recent years, the use of cy pres has expanded to the world of employment
litigation as a “last resort” for the distribution of unclaimed funds in class action
settlements.135 Although there is debate surrounding the use of cy pres awards
133. See generally J.T. Buxton, Jr., General Charitable Intent as Essential to Application of
Cy Pres Doctrine, 74 A.L.R. 671 (originally published in 1931). To understand the origins of the
cy pres doctrine, the Eighth Circuit states:
The cy pres doctrine takes its name from the Norman French expression, cy pres comme
possible, which means “as near as possible.” The doctrine originated to save
testamentary charitable gifts that would otherwise fail. Under cy pres, if the testator had
a general charitable intent, the court will look for an alternate recipient that will best serve
the gift’s original purpose. In the class action context, it may be appropriate for a court
to use cy pres principles to distribute unclaimed funds. In such a case, the unclaimed
funds should be distributed for a purpose as near as possible to the legitimate objectives
underlying the lawsuit, the interests of class members, and the interests of those similarly
situated.
Airline Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig. Travel Network v. United Air Lines, 307 F.3d 679, 682
(8th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
134. Buxton, supra note 133, at 671. Although this doctrine is typically applied to the
bequeathing of trusts, the overarching concepts can be transferred to a scenario where the Board is
like the manager of a trust with a particular intent. Id. The rule states that:
Where a main charitable purpose is disclosed with reasonable clearness, directions of the
donor relating to management of the trust, not intended as limitations, will be regarded
as directory only, and not mandatory, if necessary to preserve the trust and carry out its
leading purpose. In such cases, it will be presumed that specified details of management
were meant to be governed by circumstances; and this whether they be either
impracticable or illegal. Administrative duties may be varied, details changed, and the
main purpose carried out cy pres, or as nearly as possible according to the plan prescribed
in the trust instrument.
Id.
135. Letter from John H. Beisner, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform, to Rebecca A.
Womeldorf, Sec’y of the Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Admin. Office of the
U.S. Courts, U.S. COURTS (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/15-cv-iisuggestion_u.s.chamber_0.pdf.
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as a primary settlement option, many courts have upheld settlement agreements
with cy pres fall-back clauses for unclaimed funds.136 In Ontiveros v. Zamora,
the United States District Court of the Eastern District of California upheld the
parties’ settlement agreement, which stated that any leftover funds “are to be
redistributed to designated cy pres beneficiaries” after unclaimed settlement
funds are “redistributed to class members on a pro rata basis.” 137 This holding
is in line with the Fifth Circuit in Klier v. Elf Atochem North America, Inc.,
where the court stated, “a cy pres distribution puts settlement funds to their nextbest use by providing an indirect benefit to the class.”138
Because the agreement in Klier sought to distribute unclaimed funds through
the cy pres doctrine first before distributing residual funds within the class, the
court held the trial court “abused its discretion by ordering a cy pres distribution
in the teeth of the bargained-for-terms of the settlement agreement.”139 While
cy pres was not appropriately applied in this case, the Fifth Circuit went on to
indicate that the doctrine is properly applied when it “comes on stage to… rescue
the objectives of the settlement when the agreement fails to do so.”140
i. Cy Pres Awards Are Generally Accepted by Courts When There is a
Close Nexus Between the Intended Recipient and the Charity
Organization
Another necessary element for a cy pres award to be valid in a settlement
agreement is “that there be ‘a driving nexus between the plaintiff class and the
cy pres beneficiaries.’”141 Further, “[a] cy pres award must be ‘guided by (1) the
objectives of the underlying statute(s) and (2) the interests of the silent class
The letter states that “[i]n the vast majority of reported cases in 2014 and 2009, the cy pres provision
was essentially a fallback term designed solely to administer unclaimed funds after multiple
attempts were made to distribute the money to class members.” Id. at 6. As applied in wage and
hour class action settlements, the doctrine has “usually provided that any checks uncashed by class
members would be donated to third-party charities, rarely a significant sum of money.” Id.
136. Id. The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform notes their concern with the risk of
overly expanding the cy pres doctrine in federal class action practice and with using cy pres as a
first option rather than a last resort strictly for residual funds. Id. at 12–13.
137. Ontiveros v. Zamora, 303 F.R.D. 356, 362 (E.D. Cal. 2014). In the section entitled
“Settlement Distribution,” the settlement agreement states that “[i]n the event that any class
members fail to cash checks issued in the second round, those funds will be distributed to designated
cy pres beneficiaries.” Id. at 369. In the event that settlement awards are offered to all classes and
their members, any left-over money will revert to cy pres beneficiaries. Id.
138. Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am. Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 475 (5th Cir. 2011). Similar to the
court’s discussion in Ontiveros, the Fifth Circuit places the use of cy pres in settlement agreements
to “large-scale class actions . . . [where] money often remains in the settlement fund even after
initial distributions to class members have been made because some class members either cannot
be located or decline to file a claim.” Id. at 473.
139. Id. at 471.
140. Id. at 476.
141. Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nachshin v. AOL,
LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011)).
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members,’ and must not benefit a group ‘too remote from the plaintiff class.’”142
In Dennis v. Kellogg Co., the Ninth Circuit held that the cy pres distribution
proposed in the settlement to donate food to local charities feeding the indigent
was “divorced from the concerns embodied in consumer protection laws.”143 In
Dennis, the plaintiff class complained of the company’s misrepresentation of its
cereal as improving consumer attentiveness.144 The Court, therefore, held that
meeting the requisite nexus between the plaintiff class and a cy pres recipient
would require the company to donate instead to “organizations dedicated to
protecting consumers from . . . false advertising.”145
In cases where undocumented workers are ineligible for remedies ordinarily
awarded by the Board under Hoffman Plastic, the money should instead go into
a common fund to benefit victims of discrimination at insolvent companies.
Although the money paid to these workers would derive from another employer,
it would provide a close nexus to the objectives of the NLRA, i.e., to remedy an
employer’s wrong by making aggrieved workers whole. This would serve a
similar function as those settlement agreements with a cy pres provision acting
as a last resort when there is money left over after adequate attempts to reach
class members. In this case, because undocumented workers are not eligible
recipients of back pay awards when employers violate the NLRA, the doctrine
of cy pres could rationally be viewed as a “last resort,” saving the money
intended for the aggrieved workers and distributing it instead to a common fund
with a “close nexus” to the undocumented worker’s class.
B. Congress Should Amend the Language of the NLRA to Include Provisions
Allowing for a Common Fund in Order to Protect the Goals of the NLRA and
IRCA
Another solution to the loophole created under Hoffman Plastic, would be for
Congress to take legislative action. Although the interpretation and construction
of the NLRA is in the hands of the Board and courts, the legislature has the
ability to amend the statute. Congress should take note of the problems resulting
from the holding in Hoffman Plastic, as well as the clash between the NLRA and
IRCA. As undocumented immigrants continue to represent a notable portion of
the American workforce, Congress should address the inevitable possibility of a
growth in labor violations and recognize the strength of the NLRA when all
workers are extended the same remedies. Therefore, the simplest solution would
142. Dennis, 697 F.3d at 865.
143. Id. at 866.
144. Id. at 862.
145. Id. at 867. The Ninth Circuit based its holding on a prior decision, where the court “held
that the cy pres distribution was an abuse of discretion because there was ‘no reasonable certainty’
that any class member would benefit from it, even though the money would go ‘to areas where the
class members may live.’” Id. at 865. A common fund, however, would benefit the greater class
of workers whose labor rights have been violated, sending the money directly to workers who have
already won cases on the merits, but await a make whole remedy.
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be for Congress to resolve the confusion created by the conflicting provisions of
the NLRA and IRCA and effectively overrule Hoffman Plastic.
One possible amendment would be to add a sentence to the end of section
160(e) of the NLRA allowing for a common fund as within the Board’s remedial
discretion.146 Congress should note that such remedies are not punitive but
rather equitable solutions available to the Board to alleviate the harms of
employers violating the NLRA. Adding such language would remind employers
that violating the NLRA is subject to consequences no matter the status of the
victim of discrimination. Although the word “consequences” might trigger
perceptions of punitive actions, the necessity of holding employers accountable
in order to maintain the integrity of the NLRA is convincing and should instead
be argued as an equitable solution. Moreover, it is important to note that,
although the current construction of the NLRA bars punitive remedies and
consequential damages,147 Congress has the power to amend the NLRA to allow
for punitive remedies and fines. Therefore, even if Congress deems this type of
amendment too far outside the confines of the NLRA’s original objectives, the
option to amend the statute to require payment to a common fund for eligible
workers is at least an equitable solution within the current confines of the NLRA.
In addition to, or as an alternative to, amending the language of the statute,
Congress should propose new legislation to address the gaps to enforcing the
NLRA. The Workplace Action for a Growing Economy (WAGE) Act, for
example, was proposed in 2015 as a broad amendment to the NLRA to
strengthen protections for workers.148 As the NLRA was passed in 1935 under
146. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2012). The title of this section is “[p]revention of unfair labor practices”
and the subtitle of section ‘e’ reads: “[p]etition to court for enforcement of order; proceedings;
review of judgment.” Id. Although this section discusses the modification of a Board order, it
would make sense to include here a sentence allowing for funds owed to undocumented workers to
revert to a community fund in the event that a worker is ineligible to receive such funds.
147. Id.
148. Ross Eisenbrey, The WAGE Act will Help Strengthen Worker Protections, Raise Wages,
and Improve Working Conditions, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 16, 2015) http://www.epi.org/
publication/the-wage-act-will-help-strengthen-worker-protections-raise-wages-and-improveworking-conditions/. Proponents of the WAGE Act view the current situation in the following
light:
Rebuilding our collective bargaining system is an extremely important task for
regenerating robust wage growth and restoring our democracy. The erosion of collective
bargaining has been the major cause of wage stagnation for middle-class workers (wages
have been stagnant for both blue-collar and white-collar workers for the last dozen years)
and has been an important force in driving up overall inequality. It has affected union
and non-union workers alike, because collective bargaining sets wage standards in
industries and occupations. Union representation also provides the main vehicle for
working Americans to have a voice in legislative and political matters, helping to offset
the power of money in politics.
Id. Because it seems less likely that Congress would amend the language of a long-established
statute, it is more likely that proposing new legislation would gain greater traction, especially if
written in consideration of the current labor environment and the makeup of the American
workforce.
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completely different workplace settings,149 it is imperative that Congress re-visit
the goals of the NLRA under today’s setting and determine if the Board is able
to continue effectively enforcing said goals under precedent such as Hoffman
Plastic.
IV. CONCLUSION
Undocumented immigrants have made up a notable percentage of the
workforce in the United States for decades.150 When the NLRA was passed in
1935, the demographics of the workforce were dramatically different than
today;151 however, there are significant reports suggesting that Congress
intended the NLRA to apply to all members of the workforce in order to achieve
its purposes. With its main provisions to protect the rights of employees to
bargain collectively in order to combat the disproportionate power of
employers,152 the NLRA’s effectiveness depends on the ability of all workers to
come together as a unit. In turn, this implies that victims of discrimination under
the NLRA should have access to the same array of remedies when the Board
finds their rights violated. Facially, offering a sliding scale of remedies creates
subdivisions among workers and undermines the entire collective purpose of the
NLRA.
After the Supreme Court’s holding in Hoffman Plastic, the ability of the Board
to effectuate the policies of the NLRA was curtailed, arguably at an integral
period in workers’ rights advocacy. Without the ability to extend the traditional
Board remedies of backpay and reinstatement awards to undocumented workers,
both the goals of the NLRA and the IRCA are undermined. Without incentives
to treat undocumented workers as an equal class of employees as documented
workers, the goals of minimizing the “pull” factors of illegal immigration under
the IRCA,153 and the goals of protecting collective organizing rights under the
NLRA are stunted.154 If the purposes of both these federal statutes are to be
furthered, the Board must have the ability to fashion alternative remedies when
undocumented workers are the intended recipients. The possibility of employers
paying into a common fund or an immigrant community advocacy fund are both
solutions within the remedial power of the Board in its charge to carry out the
goals of the NLRA. Enacting these changes will help curtail the incentive to
hire undocumented workers, taking advantage of their legal vulnerability by
simultaneously strengthening American workers.
149. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
150. Jens Manuel Krogstad, 5 Facts about Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR.
(Nov. 28, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/28/5-facts-about-illegalimmigration-in-the-u-s/.
151. Donald M. Fisk, American Labor in the 20th Century, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Jan.
30, 2003), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/american-labor-in-the-20th-century.pdf.
152. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
153. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 USC § 1101 (2012).
154. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
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